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TERM OF THE COURT
statements in Knoll v. Klatt 1 and Estate of Marotz92 and formally
adopted the rule of Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp.13 The abrogated
rule viewed the trial court's finding as to the value of attorney's
fees as a finding of fact, which must be sustained unless clearly
unreasonable and against the great weight and clear preponderance
of the evidence. The court opted instead for the "independent re-
view test" by which the supreme court on appeal will solely deter-
mine whether the fees are reasonable without regard to the trial
court's finding. "The practice of law in the broad sense, both in
and out of the courts, is such a necessary part of and is so inexora-
bly connected with the exercise of the judicial power that this court





A. Application of Wisconsin Law to Shareholders of Foreign
Corporations
It is an elementary rule of law that the state of incorporation
may regulate its corporation's "internal affairs," that is, matters
affecting the relations of the shareholders, officers, and directors
among themselves. When states other than the charter state at-
tempt to control corporate affairs, the waters are no longer so
clear. In Joncas v. Krueger,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court faced
a fact situation presenting a question at the fringes of the problem
of applying state law to foreign corporations. Unfortunately, the
decision left the issues more clouded than before.
In Joncas, a Delaware corporation licensed and doing business
in Wisconsin became insolvent and made a voluntary assignment
for the benefit of creditors. The assets were insufficient to satisfy
the wage claims of some of the corporate employees. Certain of
91. 43 Wis. 2d 265, 168 N.W.2d 555 (1969).
92. 263 Wis. 99, 56 N.W.2d 856 (1953).
93. 14 Wis. 2d 479, Il1 N.W.2d 419 (1961).
94. In re Integration of Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 622, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1958).
1. Joncas v. Krueger, 61 Wis. 2d 529, 213 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
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these employees brought an action in Wisconsin to hold sharehold-
ers of the corporation liable for a portion of the claims pursuant
to Wisconsin Statute section 180.40(6). The section reads as fol-
lows:
The shareholders of every corporation, other than railroad cor-
porations, shall be personally liable to an amount equal to the
par value of shares owned by them respectively, and to the con-
sideration for which their shares without par value was issued,
for all debts owing to employees of the corporation for services
performed for such corporation, but not exceeding 6 months'
service in any one case.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a circuit court ruling sus-
taining a demurrer to the complaint, and held that section
180.40(6) permits a cause of action for wage claims to be main-
tained against shareholders of a foreign corporation.
The rationale of the decision follows a relatively simple sequ-
ence: first, the statute as interpreted in light of its language and
history was intended to apply to foreign corporations; second, the
assessment of the shareholder falls within the power of the state;
third, the assessment is justified from a policy standpoint by the
interest, being protected by Wisconsin. However, upon a closer
examination, the decision finds little support in either law or pol-
icy, and had the reach of the statute been limited to shareholders
of domestic corporations many existing difficulties could have been
avoided.
Support for the broad reach given the statute by the decision
rests on the meaning given the words "every corporation" as they
appear in the statute. Interpretation requires consideration of both
their literal meaning and their meaning when modified by the defi-
nitions section of Chapter 180. The definition of "corporation" in
the chapter is as follows:
180.02 Definitions. As used in this chapter, unless the context
otherwise requires, the term:
(I) "Corporation" or "domestic corporation" means a cor-
poration organized for profit with capital stock which is subject
to the provisions of this chapter, except a foreign corporation
... . (Emphasis added) 2
As can be readily seen, the literal and the definitional interpreta-
tions of "every corporation" are not in harmony. The ambiguity
2. WIs. STAT. § 180.02 (1971).
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is acknowledged by the court in the amount of print expended in
attempting to reach a solution.
A favored method resolving ambiguities in statutes is to consult
the history of the act in an effort to ascertain the intent of the
legislature. In Joncas, the court resorted to this method, although
not with the thoroughness necessary to reach an accurate conclu-
sion. The court attached significance to the fact that in the prede-
cessor to the present section 180.40(6),3 the words "any corpora-
tion organized under the provisions of this chapter" (emphasis
added) was changed to "every corporation." 4 At first glance, this
change would appear to expand the coverage of the section. How-
ever, the court neglected to note that throughout the statutory
revision where the change occurred, the word "any" was used in
permissive sections only, while the word "every" was used to sig-
nify the fact that compliance with the section was mandated. Given
this fact, the court's argument loses considerable strength. Infirmi-
ties similar to this also exist in the court's examination of the titling
of statutory chapters.' The point is that an examination of the
statute's history does not yield so strong an interpretation favoring
application of section 180.40(6) to foreign corporations as the
opinion would lead the reader to believe.
The second step of the opinion's sequence consists of attempt-
ing to establish that Wisconsin has the power to assess sharehold-
ers of foreign corporations. According to the court, the power
arises when a foreign corporation seeks to do business in Wiscon-
sin. At that time, the corporation impliedly submits to Wisconsin's
statutory restrictions on corporate conduct.' Although the court's
theory of implied submission is a correct statement of the law,
application of the theory to the facts in Joncas exceeds the theory's
own limitations. An examination of the precedent cited by the
court in support of its position exposes this overextension.
The court seeks support chiefly in two cases, Thomas v.
Mattiessen7 and Pinney v. Nelson.' Both cases arose under the
3. The changes which have occurred in the statute since 1853 are for the most part
incidental to the issues of this case, e.g., the creation of limits of shareholder liability where
no-par stock is involved. Wis. Laws of 1927, ch. 534, sec. 55a.
4. Wis. RaV. STAT. 1878, ch. 85, sec. 1769.
5. Extensive discussion on the sequence of titling is found in Respondent's Brief support-
ing the motion for rehearing.
6. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931); 17 W. FLETCHER,
CORPORATIONS § 8386 (rev. ed. 1960).
7. 232 U.S. 221 (1914).
8. 183 U.S. 144 (1901).
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same California statute,9 which expressly permitted the assessment
of shareholders of foreign corporations for the payment of corpo-
rate debts. The United States Supreme Court permitted recovery
by the corporate creditors in each case, even going so far as to
permit recovery against a non-California resident. The theory
under which recovery was allowed in each case was contract. How-
ever, the contract focused on in these cases is not identical to the
contract on which liability in Joncas was founded. Here lies the
most significant weakness of the Wisconsin decision.
The Pinney and Thomas cases find that the right to assess
shareholders arises out of the contract of the shareholders with one
another."0 For purposes of identification, this is the contract which
brings the corporation into existence. It is assented to by a sub-
scription to stock. In comparison, the contract on which the Wis-
consin Supreme Court supports its power to impose liability under
section 180.40(6) is the contract between the corporation and the
state. As mentioned earlier, this contract is formed at the time that
the corporation enters a state for the purpose of doing business.
The defect of the Joncas decision is that it imposes a supposedly
contractual liability while failing to find a contract to which the
shareholders themselves were parties. The two contracts men-
tioned will now be discussed in more depth.
The form of the contractual link in both United States Su-
preme Court cases is the corporate charter. For purposes of analy-
sis, the corporate charter should be considered merely as the em-
bodiment of the contract between the shareholders which creates
the corporate organization. In Pinney, the charter of a Colorado
corporation contained a purposes clause specifically stating that
corporate activity in California was envisioned. A similar provision
was found in the corporate charter of the Thomas case. Just as
9. CAL. CIv. CODE § 322, Code Am. 1875-76, ch. 218, p. 73, § I (repealed 1929):
Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and personally liable for such
proportion of its debts and liabilities as the amount of stock or shares owned by him
bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock or shares of the corporation, and
for a like proportion only of each debt or claim against the corporation. Any creditor
of the corporation may institute joint or several actions against any of its stockhold-
ers, for the proportion of his claim payable by each, and in such action the court
must ascertain the proportion of the claim or debt for which each defendant is liable,
and a several judgment must be rendered against each, in conformity therewith.
The liability of each stockholder of a corporation, formed under the laws of any
other State or Territory of the United States, or of any foreign country, and doing
business within this State, shall be the same as the liability of a stockholder of a
corporation created under the constitution and laws of this State.
10. Pinney v. Nelson, supra, at 183 U.S. 150.
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shareholders impliedly include the laws of the charter state in the
contract between themselves," the Supreme Court found that the
shareholders in Pinney and Thomas expressly included the provi-
sions of the California corporate statutes in their contract when
they made reference to doing business there. It is noteworthy that
the mere existence of the California statutes was not sufficient to
imply that the shareholders wrote their contract in contemplation
of those laws. Returning to Joncas, it follows that since the articles
of incorporation of the Delaware corporation did not refer to Wis-
consin, the contractual duty undertaken by each shareholder did
not include assessment for corporate wage debts under the Wiscon-
sin Statute.
One corollary to the theory of the shareholders' incorporating
a corporate code into their contract by reference is the rule that
the mere doing of business in a foreign state does not act to modify
the shareholders' contract. As stated by Justice Holmes in
Thomas: "We agree that without authority from the stockholder
a corporation cannot make him answerable in a way not contem-
plated by the charter."'' 2 This corollary is justified by traditional
contract theory. A state which the corporation enters for the pur-
pose of doing business deals only with the corporate entity. As to
the corporation itself, the state can imply acceptance of the state's
laws as a condition of doing business. All of the operative elements
necessary to form a contract are present. Each party is aware of
the proposed terms since a corporation is held to constructive no-
tice of the statutory requirements. Consent is voluntary, and is
communicated by the fact of entry into the state. Consideration
passes.'" In contrast to this situation, the shareholders themselves
are not offering to do business in the foreign state, and they do
nothing which might be construed as an acceptance of a bargain
which imposes the law of the foreign state. Lacking a contractual
relation with the shareholders in the first instance, the corpora-
tions's entry into the state changes nothing.
The third aspect of the Joncas decision, namely justification
based on policy issues, falls short of showing a compelling need for
the holding. Even conceding the fact that the determination of
I i. Gelfert v. Nat. City Bank of New York, 313 U.S. 221 (1941); Wood v. Lovett, 313
U.S. 362 (1941); 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 551 (1950).
12. 232 U.S. at 243-244.
13. The corporation receives the privilege of doing business and in exchange incurs the
detriment of conforming to the state laws regulating the conduct of foreign corporations.
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policy issues requires comparison of values not easily quantified, 4
the Wisconsin court's resolution of the problem is not satisfactory.
The interest sought to be protected by Wisconsin is the assur-
ance that its wage earners are paid. However, past interpretations
of section 180.40(6) do not define the purpose of the statute in such
constricted terms. In Clokus v. Hollister Mining Co.," the court
ruled that wage claims brought against corporate shareholders
under this statute need not arise from services rendered in Wiscon-
sin. In dictum, the court even indicated that the statute might be
available to non-resident employees. The statement reads as fol-
lows:
All laborers, without reference to the place where the labor is
performed, have a right to share equally with laborers who per-
form work in this state, in the benefits of the statute."
When this dictum in Clokus is combined with the holding in
Joncas, Wisconsin is found purporting to invest non-resident wage
claimants with a cause of action against foreign corporations. It is
doubtful that other states would accept this assertion of sover-
eignty.
Two constitutional issues merit some mention. The court itself
referred to a possible equal protection problem, expressing concern
that employees of foreign corporations would not enjoy the same
wage claim protection as employees of Wisconsin corporations,
and therefore would be receiving unequal treatment under Wiscon-
sin law. The problem posed is easily resolved. In statutes other
than ones containing "suspect classifications,"'' a party challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a statute under the equal protection
clause must show that the classification made by the statute serves
no proper legislative purpose. Wisconsin's interest in encouraging
certainty in shareholder obligations would appear to be a sufficient
legislative purpose to refute any such challenge, if in fact the issue
were ever reached in light of the negative which the challenging
party must prove.
14. See W. Reese and E. Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of
Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958).
15. 92 Wis. 325, 66 N.W. 398 (1896).
16. 92 Wis. at 327, 66 N.W. at 399.
17. That is, classifications affecting some fundamental right or themselves inferring
discrimination, as with racial classifications. For a concise discussion of this concept, see
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973).
18. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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The other constitutional issue that might be raised is whether
the full faith and credit clause 9 requires Wisconsin to recognize the
limited liability provided under Delaware law. It is doubtful that
the clause applies. The statute implementing the clause 21 limits its
application to "the Acts of the legislature of any State. . ." and
to "the records and judicial proceedings of any court of any State
. . .. " In other words, if the limited liability of shareholders arose
under an express statute of Delaware, the full faith and credit
clause would demand that Wisconsin recognize this aspect of
shareholder status. However, the origin of limited liability is not
statutory. 21 Rather it is a logical outgrowth of the concept of corpo-
rate entity.22 Persons who deal with a corporation deal only with
this ficticious person. Having no contact with the shareholders
themselves, they have no basis for asserting a liability as to them.
The conclusion, then, is that the full faith and credit clause does
not apply because limited liability is not created by a statute
which could be recognized.
The problems raised by Joncas are serious. If statutes similar
in operation to section 180.40(6) were widely enacted and inter-
preted broadly as in Joncas, private investment in corporations
would be seriously deterred. 23 Even aside from this practical ef-
fect, the legal conclusions of the case find little support or logic in
a federal system .24
B. Parent and Subsidiary Corporations
In the midst of a decision concerned with corporate taxation,
the court in American Motors Corporation v. Department of
Revenue2 reviewed its position with respect to contracts between
parent and subsidiary corporations. Ruling consistently with its
past decisions,26 the court held that a contract between the parent
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1.
20. 28 U.S.C. 1738 (1970).
21. The concept was recognized in England by statute, but this practice was not followed
in the United States. Limited Liability Act of 1855 (18, 19 Vict. ch. 133).
22. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 146 (1970); H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 119, 127
(rev. ed. 1946).
23. D. Rogers and D. McManus, Stockholders' Booby-Trap: Partnership Liabilities
Under Section 71, New York Stock Corporation Law, 28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1149 (1953).
24. S. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV.
433 (1968); but also see W. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974), where broader application of state law to foreign
corporations is advocated as a means of imposing the corporate duties that have gradually
been eliminated in the competition to attract incorporators with permissive statutes.
25. 64 Wis. 2d 337, 219 N.W.2d 300 (1974).
26. See note 13 at 64 Wis. 2d 347, 219 N.W.2d 305.
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and subsidiary was valid, and would be considered voidable only
where there is some showing of fraud or unfairness. This respect
for the corporate entity exists even though the officers of the two
corporations are identical. The holding conforms to the generally
recognized rule. 21
C. Breach of Contract by a Corporation, Possible Second Cause
of Action
In Lorenz v. Dreske,2 a psychiatrist sued a clinical corporation
for the value of professional services allegedly rendered. In addi-
tion the psychiatrist sued the president of the corporation, alleging
that the president had interfered with the corporation's perform-
ance of the contract, especially in refusing to approve payroll
checks for services performed. The trial court overruled demurrers
to both causes of action, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court af-
firmed.
In recognizing the separate cause of action against the corpo-
rate officer in his individual capacity, the court first had to concep-
tually sever the officer from his corporation. This was accom-
plished by relying on the rule of agency law that an agent acts
outside of his authority when he commits certain intentional torts,
here interference with contract.29 With the officer's conduct no
longer identified with corporate conduct, he could be considered a
party removed from the contract for purposes of the tort. The
court did not discuss the tort itself in any depth,"0 nor the possible
effects that a recovery on the contract might have as against a
recovery in tort. The fact situation of the case is common enough
to expect that these issues will be raised before the court in the
future.
D. Ratfication of Corporate Qfficer's Conduct
The rules measuring the authority of agents generally deter-
27. H. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L.
REV. 12 (1925); Note, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1958). For some general rules as to what constitutes fraud or unfair-
ness, see H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 148 (1970).
28. 62 Wis. 2d 273, 214 N.W.2d 753 (1973).
29. The court at 62 Wis. 2d 286, 214 N.W.2d 760 quoted with approval H. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 112 (rev. ed. 1946). See also SEAVEY, AGENCY § 129 (1964); Miller v.
Ortman, 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17 (1956).
30. See W. PROSSER, LAW OP TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971); F. Harper, Interference with
Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 873 (1953); Comment, Interference with Con-
tractual Relations: A Survey of Wisconsin Law, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 231 (1959).
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mine whether a corporate officer has bound his corporation
through his conduct. However, even where the officer did not have
authority when he acted, the benefits of his actions may sometimes
be reaped by the corporation through the remedial act of ratifica-
tion. The case of Estate of Mihelcicll deals with some of the
technical rules which must be followed to effectuate a ratification.
In that case a probate court was required to determine whether
certain real estate belonged to a corporation or to the estate of its
officer-director Mihelcic. The land had originally been purchased
for storage space for the corporation, the deed naming the corpora-
tion as sole grantee. There was some evidence that Mihelcic con-
tributed about half of the original purchase price of $2000 from his
own funds. The real estate was listed as a corporate asset, and the
corporation paid property taxes on it. Several years after the origi-
nal purchase, Mihelcic, noticing that the property was listed
among the corporation's assets, told the corporate bookkeeper that
the property was his. The bookkeeper was instructed to charge
Mihelcic's account for $1500 for the purpose of completing the
purchase. The $1500 figure was arrived at by adding the half of the
original purchase price not paid by Mihelcic to the approximate
amount of property taxes paid by the corporation on the property.
No deed evidencing this alleged sale was executed on behalf of the
corporation. At the combined shareholders and directors meeting
for the year of this second "transaction," a resolution ratifying "all
acts undertaken for and on behalf of this corporation by the offi-
cers and directors'3 2 was adopted. The estate argued, among other
things, that the transaction which purportedly gave Mihelcic title
should be given full effect because of the ratification resolution.
The court disagreed and affirmed the finding of the probate court
that Mihelcic's conduct was insufficient to obtain title.
Ratification, under the facts of this case,3 is the formal ap-
proval given by the board of directors to acts by a corporate officer
which were beyond his power at the time they were performed. A
ratification results in giving full legal effect to the officer's acts,
just as though authority existed at the time of the act.34
31. 63 Wis. 2d 33, 216 N.W.2d 245 (1974).
32. 63 Wis. 2d at 37, 216 N.W.2d at 247.
33. Note that ratification can occur under two different sets of circumstances. Share-
holders may ratify an action of the board of directors where there is some doubt as to the
propriety or authority of the act. Or, as in this case, the board of directors may ratify the
acts of an officer whose conduct has exceeded his power. Compare H. HENN,
CORPORATIONS § 194 (1970) with H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 60, 61 (rev. ed. 1946).
34. Diederich v. Wisconsin Wood Products, 247 Wis. 212, 19 N.W.2d 268 (1945). H.
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 60 (rev. ed. 1946).
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An examination of Mihelcic's position in the sale points up why
a ratification was needed. Mihelcic was a corporate agent at the
time of the sale, and the logical inference was that he acted exclu-
sively in the corporation's interest. Under this inference, a theory
of partial personal ownership of the property would be negatived
from the very beginning. The other possible explanation of Mihel-
cic's conduct was that he engaged in self-dealing. In his capacity
as corporate officer, he acted as seller in the second "transaction."
In buying, he acted in his individual capacity. The two postures
clearly conflicted. Because he was not forwarding the interests of
the corporation in making the sale, Mihelcic impaired his power
to act as an agent. 5 In addition, his full knowledge of the circum-
stances destroyed the defense of apparent authority ordinarily
available to buyers. The absence of authority rendered the contract
voidable. When the corporation challenged the sale, the estate as-
sumed the burden of proving ratification as a means of escaping
the consequences of the transaction's voidability.
The court found two defects in the alleged ratification. Con-
cerning the knowledge of directors when they vote to ratify, the
court ruled that actual knowledge of the facts of the transaction is
required. At trial, the directors testified that they had no knowl-
edge of the "sale" of land by the corporation, and this was held
sufficient to nullify the effect of the non-specific ratification resolu-
tion. This aspect of the decision points out the vulnerable nature
of these blanket resolutions. The burden of proving the validity of
the ratification is on the officer. This burden entails establishing
all of the requisite elements, including knowledge of the directors
who vote to ratify. Absent a writing of some form, preferably the
resolution itself, it is difficult to refute testimony by the directors
to the effect that they had no actual knowledge of the facts of the
matter.
The court's other objection to the alleged ratification dealt with
the appropriateness of invoking it. Finding that the estate had not
sufficiently established that there even was a transaction, the court
found nothing to ratify. The conclusion that a transaction did not
exist was reached by evaluating the facts in evidence, such as the
absence of a deed or corporate resolution indicating the existence
of the sale. Again, the need for specificity in ratification resolutions
is illustrated. Had a resolution expressly mentioned the sale, the
resolution itself might have evidenced the transaction sufficiently
to avoid this particular objection.
35. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 238 (1970).
[Vol. 58
TERM OF THE COURT
II. BANKING
A bank's right to set off funds in a depositor's account against
the amounts due on the depositor's other obligations to the bank
is among the most effective creditor's remedies. But because case
law defines much of its operation and because its use is limited to
a special class of creditors, the exact extent of its priority is often
not clear. In Commercial Discount Corporation v. Milwaukee
Western Bank,36 the court defined what priority is to be given to
a bank's setoff as against a contractual security interest in the
funds deposited.
In Commercial Discount, the plaintiff held a perfected security
interest in the accounts receivable of its debtor Simplex Shoe Com-
pany. "Proceeds" 37 of the accounts receivable were also made
subject to the security interest. The debtor Simplex Shoe deposited
funds which were proceeds of the accounts receivable with the
defendant Milwaukee Western Bank. Checks were drawn by Sim-
plex Shoe on this account for the purpose of paying creditors other
than Commercial Discount Corporation. During the period when
Simplex was actively expending the proceeds of the accounts re-
ceivable, it borrowed $240,000 from the defendant bank. Simplex
defaulted its obligation to the bank, in response to which the bank
set off the full amount of the funds deposited against the balance
due on the $240,000 loan.
Commercial Discount Corporation attempted to recover the
proceeds which were taken by the bank in exercising its right of
setoff. No question was raised as to the validity of Commercial
Discount's security interest in the funds deposited, rather the bank
contended that its right of setoff under Wisconsin Statute section
895.0711 conferred a superior right. The decision establishes limits
to the right of setoff beyond those found on the face of the statute.
36. 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
37. Wis. STAT. § 409.306(1).
38. The relevant portions of Wis. STAT. § 895.07 are as follows:
Set-offs. In the following cases a demand by one party may be set off against and
as a defense, in whole or in part, to demands by the other:
(1) It must be a demand arising upon a judgment or upon contract, express or
implied, whether such contract be written or unwritten, sealed or without seal; and
if it be founded upon a bond or other contract having a penalty the sum equitably
due by virtue of its conditions only shall be set off.
(2) It must be due to him in his own right, either as being the original creditor
or payee or as being the assignee and owner of the demand.
(3) It must have existed at the time of the commencement of the action, and
must then have belonged to the party claiming to set off the same.
1975]
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Some discussion of the right of setoff will aid in understanding
the issues. Phrased broadly, a bank has an interest in all the prop-
erty of its customer in its possession, to the extent that there is a
balance due the bank on the customer's other dealings with the
bank. Loosely termed a "banker's lien," the rights incident to the
bank's interest exceed mere lien rights. Based either on equitable
principles39 or on a contract implied from the general understand-
ing by depositors of the conduct of banking business," courts have
allowed banks to debit the account of the depositor for the amount
of his indebtedness without any prior judicial approval." The equi-
table basis of the rule arises from the recognition of the undue
hardship placed on the debtor who is forced to pay his obligation
to a person who is unlikely to fulfill a return obligation. Setoff
operates to reduce the two obligations to one debt by computing
the difference between them.
The rule of setoff then, is straightforward when applied to the
interests of the two parties whose obligations run to each other.
When the interest of a third party is introduced into the problem,
corollaries must be formulated to deal with it. About the only
guidance in constructing these corollaries are provided by the rules
of equity, since setoff is essentially an equitable remedy.
Two theories have governed the determination of a bank's right
to setoff against a deposit when a third party claims a right in the
deposit funds. Under the first of these theories, the state of the
bank's knowledge is determinative. If the bank has knowledge that
the deposited funds belong to a third party, it cannot exercise a
right of setoff as to those funds under any circumstances. 2 Con-
versely, if the bank does not have knowledge of a third party's
interest, it may exercise its right unhindered. Some jurisdictions
consider knowledge of facts that would suggest further inquiry as
being equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of this rule. 3
(4) It can be allowed only in actions founded upon demands which could them-
selves be subject of set-off according to law.
39. C. ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING §§ 4391, 4392 (1936).
40. R. Clark, Set-off in Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvency and Receivership, 34
HARV. L. REV. 178, 194 (1920). This article also raises the point that because the bank holds
full title to funds deposited, it is conceptually impossible to call that interest a lien.
41. At least one writer has examined the possible implications of procedural due process
in this area. See, Note, Banking Setoff. A Study in Commercial Obsolescence, 23 HAST.
L. REv. 1585, 1602 (1972). Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 1895
(1974) appears to have vitiated much of the writer's argument.
42. Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235 (1966).
43. Id.
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The subordinate position of a third party secured creditor
under this traditional rule is not improved by compliance with
chapter 409 of the Wisconsin Statutes.44 The obvious limitation on
the effectiveness of contractual security in this context is the exclu-
sion of setoffs from the operation of the chapter by Wisconsin
Statute section 409.104(8). A closer search of the chapter reveals
nothing inconsistent with the exclusion or its inferential recogni-
tion of the priority given setoffs under the common law. The filing
of a financing statement will serve as constructive notice to all
creditors of the particular debtor.45 When the security interest cov-
ers proceeds of the original collateral, constructive notice and its
consequent priority are usually still afforded despite the difficulties
experienced by later creditors in identifying what assets are pro-
ceeds.4" Although the bank in its status as creditor is imputed
notice of the security interest in proceeds, the setoff priority is not
affected. Knowledge, as opposed to notice, is needed to strip the
bank of its priority, and chapter 409 compliance does not impute
knowledge. The difficulties sometimes encountered when distin-
guishing between notice and knowledge 7 are not important here,
because the statutes define both the procedure and effect of filing.
The court wisely adopted a rule under which a bank's knowl-
edge does not ultimately determine priority as against a party other
than the depositor. Called the "equitable rule," it holds that a bank
cannot set off deposited funds belonging to a third person unless
the bank can show that it either (1) changed its position in reliance
on a setoff, or (2) has some other superior equity. It is important
to note that the rule applies only where the bank did not have
knowledge of the third party's interest. Even though the fact situa-
tions of cases decided on equitable grounds are assigned limited
precedential value, future cases are needed to illustrate what is a
"change of position" or "superior equity." Only then can the full
impact of the case be assessed.
In another issue of the case, the plaintiff attempted to hold the
bank liable as an aider and abettor of Simplex in wrongfully im-
pairing the value of the security interest by paying on checks drawn
on the account. The court held that actual knowledge is required
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 9.
45. WIs. STAT. § 409.201 (1971).
46. Wis. STAT. § 409.306 (1971).
47. Zdunek v. Thomas, 215 Wis. 11,254 N.W. 382 (1934); Attoe v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 539, 153 N.W.2d 575 (1967).
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before the liability attaches. The plaintiff did not meet his burden
of proving knowledge, having failed to notify the bank before pay-
ment that it should not honor the checks. The court further ruled
that a bank is under no duty to inquire whether a depositor's funds
are subject to a security interest. This statement of the law pro-
duces no startling results. The notice provisions of chapter 409 do
not affect the cause of action and the ruling is sound from a policy
standpoint, the court being unwilling to burden banks with the
impossible task of ascertaining whether funds deposited are subject
to a security interest.
In conclusion, the case is important for two reasons. First, it
adds a restriction to the right of setoff not found on the face of
Wisconsin Statute section 895.07. Second, it rules that actual
knowledge of a third party's interest is an element of a cause of
action against a bank for impairing the value of a security interest.
III. CONTRACTS
A. Partial Performance of a Construction Contract
Because of the extended period over which performance occurs
and the complexity of specifications, construction contracts often
present special problems. In the case of Voight v. Nanz 8 the court
considered the options open to a contractor who is faced with a
breach of contract after only partial performance has occurred. In
the case, a contract provided that payments to the contractor were
to be made ". . . 10 days after semi-monthly statements, as work
is done."49 Payments by the owner of the building were delinquent
from the very beginning. In spite of the repeated delays in pay-
ment, the contractor continued to perform until he had billed out
approximately seventy per cent of the bid price of $17,490. The
contractor ceased work when the building owner tendered partial
payment of a $4717 unpaid bill, acceptance of which was condi-
tioned upon the contractor's agreeing to modify the payment pro-
visions in the original contract. The tender was refused, at which
time the building owner hired another contractor to complete the
job. The original contractor sued the building owner for damages.
The case is important because it sets out the options available
to the contractor faced with a situation where an installment is not
paid. Quoting Corbin, the court sanctioned three courses of action:
48. 61 Wis. 2d 710, 213 N.W.2d 749 (1974).
49. 61 Wis. 2d at 711, 213 N.W.2d at 750.
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(1) suspend work; (2) suspend work, renouncing the contract; (3)
proceed with work, treating the non-payment as a partial breach."
The neat order of the options conceals the real difficulty facing the
contractor, namely determining which party committed the first
material breach. While options one and three above do not require
a material breach before their utilization, option two does. Any
effort to renounce the contract exposes the contractor to a possible
suit for damages, because the first party to commit a "material
breach" is held liable under the present state of the law. The issue
is treated as a question of fact, with predictability being reduced
accordingly. Contract law offers few guidelines other than prece-
dents making ad hoc determinations of materiality. This case be-
longs among those precedents.
The confusion that the issue of materiality presents is illus-
trated by the facts of the case. The plaintiff contractor suspended
work, but did not renounce the contract. The defendant property
owner, considering the suspension or work a material breach of the
contract renounced the contract and hired a different contractor.
The property owner guessed the wrong answer, and had to pay
damages. In short, each party exposed itself to some form of loss
because no real assurance as to which party committed the first
material breach was available.
One additional factor which clouds the issue of breach in a
contract where many performances are exchanged is waiver. A
waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known
right.51 In a contract situation, the right to a remedy for breach can
be waived by conduct inconsistent with the assertion of the right.5 2
In Voight, the court indicated that the continuation of work after
the other party's failure to meet an installment would act as a
waiver of the right to consider that particular act a breach. Since
recovery was ultimately based on the property owner's failure to
pay on time, it appears that the court will allow the contractor to
waive seriatim breaches for untimely payment without jeopardiz-
ing his right to invoke his full remedies at the next breach.3 This
50. A fuller discussion of the consequences following the selection of each option is
found at 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 693 (rev. ed. 1960). See also C. MCCORMICK,
DAMAGES § 164 (1935); E. Patterson, Builder's Measure of Recovery for Breach of
Contract, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1286 (1931).
51. McNaughton v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., 140 Wis. 214, 122 N.W. 764 (1909).
52. Guschl v. Schmidt, 266 Wis. 410, 63 N.W.2d 759 (1954); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis.
2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1962).
53. But see Boden v. Maher, 105 Wis. 539, 81 N.W. 661 (1900).
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rule achieves the desired result of permitting the party to the con-
tract to himself evaluate whether court action or continuation
under the contract will best serve his interests.
B. Substantial Performance of a Construction Contract
Ordinarily, a party who is to receive a performance under an
executory contract is entitled to require that the performance con-
form exactly to the contract terms. If the performance does not
conform, it can be rejected as non-performance. In the area of
building contracts, the law is not so severe. A finding of fact that
a building contractor has substantially performed gives him a
cause of action for payment under the contract, although the con-
tract price will be diminished to the extent that the contractor has
fallen short of performing exactly. Two examples of what consti-
tutes substantial performance and some discussion of the formulas
for figuring the property owner's damages are presented in the
cases of Stevens Construction Corporation v. Carolina
Corporation54 and W. G. Slugg Seed and Fertilizer, Inc. v. Paulsen
Lumber, Inc.5
In Stevens Construction, a building contractor sued for the
balance due on the contract price. The contractor had been hired
to partially design and build a three building apartment complex.
The design provisions were agreed to as a feasible means of cutting
architects' fees, since the contractor had previously built apart-
ments of similar design. The plaintiff contractor subcontracted
to have Concrete Research, Inc. design and construct the pre-
stressed concrete structure of the building. A miscalculation by
Concrete Research, Inc. resulted in a concrete structure that was
significantly weaker than the specifications required. After the
court found that the plaintiff contractor had assumed a contractual
duty to design the building's concrete structure, it examined the
question of whether substantial performance had occurred, a "con-
structive condition" precedent to payment under the contract.56
The court approved the trial court's finding of substantial perform-
ance, relying chiefly on the fact that the cost of repairing the defect
(about $21,000) was less than one percent of the total contract price
of $3.27 million.5 7
54. 63 Wis. 2d 342, 217 N.W.2d 291 (1974).
55. 62 Wis. 2d 220, 214 N.W.2d 413 (1974).
56. For an explanation of the concept of constructive condition in this context, see 3A
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 701 (rev. ed. 1960). A more general view is contained in E.
Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1942).
57. For a case illustrating when substantial performance will not be found, see Kreyer
v. Driscoll, 39 Wis. 2d 540, 159 N.W.2d 680 (1968).
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The damage award sanctioned by the court is noteworthy in
that amounts calculated under each of the two traditional damage
formulas were added together. The first of these rules is usually
called the cost of repair rule. It is invoked when the defects remain-
ing after the contractor has submitted his work can be cured at a
reasonable price. The balance due the contractor is the contract
price minus the cost of curing the defects. This method of making
the property owner whole is preferred by the Wisconsin court,5 8
and is to be used where possible. The other means of determining
what amount the contractor is to receive in his final payment is
called the "diminished value rule." It operates to figure the pay-
ment by subtracting from the contract price the amount by which
the fair market value of the building as actually completed falls
short of what the fair market value would have been had specifica-
tions been met exactly. Since this form of remedy does not accom-
plish the optimum result of putting the property owner in the
position he bargained for, its utilization is to be limited to situa-
tions where actual repairs cannot be undertaken at reasonable cost.
In Stevens Construction, the trial court reduced the contrac-
tor's final payment by $24,518.63. Of that amount, $21,518.63 rep-
resented the money expended by the property owner in curing the
defects in the concrete structure. $3000 of the award represented
the diminished fair market value of the building. The point made
by the supreme court in approving the damages is that the alterna-
tive remedies are not exclusive, and may be combined where feasi-
ble.
The feasibility of combining the remedies was dealt with in W.
G. Slugg Seed and Fertilizer.9 There several important deviations
from the specifications existed after the contractor completed his
job of building a cinderblock warehouse. The bid price was approx-
imately $120,000. Evidence showed that the deviations from speci-
fications diminished the fair market value of the building by
$45,000. The parties reached an agreement that the contractor
would pay the expenses of correcting certain of these defects. Dur-
ing the course of repair, a fire completely destroyed the building.
Suit was instituted by the owner to recover his damages, but rather
than limit himself to the cost of repairs, he also requested a special
instruction on the diminished value of the building as built com-
58. Buchholz v. Rosenberg, 163 Wis. 312, 156 N.W. 946 (1916); 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1090 (rev. ed. 1960).
59. Note 55, supra.
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pared to the value the building would have had if built in accord-
ance with the contract. The irregular problem presented under the
facts was that corrections costing $15,500 increased the fair market
value of the building by only $5,000 still leaving a $40,000 fair
market value deficit.
In the property owner's suit, the contractor was faced with
damage elements under each of the two theories. The plaintiff
correctly directed his evidence to proving the maximum amount
recoverable under each theory, so that there existed a substantial
possibility that the jury would not reduce the maximum recovera-
ble under one theory in proportion to amounts awarded under the
other. The effect would have been to make the remedies partially
cumulative, in clear contravention of their judicially defined alter-
native status. The trial court recognized the problem and instructed
on the diminished value rule only. The Wisconsin court held that
this was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. The court
then proposed its own solution to the problem. Briefly stated, a
trial court is to apply the cost of repair rule to those items which
can be or have been corrected at reasonable cost. As to any remain-
ing uncorrected defects, damages will be measured by the dimin-
ished value rule.
The solution is satisfactory. The separation of damage ele-
ments under the solution is sound in theory and capable of being
effectuated with simple jury instructions. In addition, the efforts
of the property owner to ultimately receive what he bargained for
are aided and the contractor is protected from a verdict where
damage amounts figured under each formula might simply be ag-
gregated.
C. Contract Interpretation
When a contract is in writing, evidence extrinsic to that writing
may properly be excluded under certain circumstances. Two sepa-
rate theories govern the process of exclusion. Each was illustrated
by a case in the 1973 term, Marshall and Ilsley Bank v. Milwaukee
Gear Company"0 on the parol evidence rule and the Stevens
Construction case"1 on contract interpretation.
In Stevens Construction, the defendant property owner coun-
terclaimed against the plaintiff building contractor alleging a
60. 62 Wis. 2d 768, 216 N.W.2d I (1974).
61. Note 54, supra.
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breach of contract. The contractual duty allegedly breached was
the duty to design a prestressed concrete system in the building
being constructed. The contract was written and the trial court
found it to be integrated, that is, was intended by the parties to be
the final and complete expression of their agreement. 2 The con-
tractual language on which the court based its finding of contrac-
tual duty owed by the contractor was as follows: "Furnish and
install all present concrete columns, precast basement beams and
spancrete planks."63 The issue before the court was the interpreta-
tion of this provision.
The purpose of interpreting a contract is ascertaining the intent
of the parties to it." The words were written to convey a meaning,
and the introduction of evidence to ascertain that meaning should
be encouraged by trial courts. However, courts do not always fol-
low a blanket rule of admitting evidence relevant to this purpose,
even though the justification of this practice is shallow or non-
existent.
When evidence is excluded by a court, the rationale used is that
the language of the contract is so plain and clear as to admit of
only one meaning.65 This rationale only disguises the fact that the
judge is using extrinsic evidence in the form of his own linguistic
experience, which is admitted sub silentio by judicial notice.66 The
stature given to this evidence is heightened by the exclusion of
other evidence on the subject. Since at the formation of the con-
tract the parties had no knowledge of the judge's opinions about
the meaning of language, this methodology has its own measure
of falsification.
Viewing the Stevens Construction case in terms of result, there
is little to quarrel with. The evidence introduced to show what
meaning each of the parties attached to the contract language was
admitted. However, the court took a needlessly roundabout path
in reaching its result, and in doing so employed a rule which could
produce less satisfactory results in other cases. The court reaches
its conclusion to admit evidence by ostensibly finding a "latent
ambiguity" and then letting in evidence to clarify it. In doing this,
62. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 228 (1932).
63. 63 Wis. 2d at 353, 217 N.W.2d at 297.
64. 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 542, 542A (rev. ed. 1960).
65. Klueter v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 143 Wis. 347, 128 N.W. 43 (1910); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949).
66. A. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORN. L.
Q. 161, 173 (1964).
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the court misconceives the true order of events in the trial court.
According to the court, an ambiguity is latent "when it does
not appear from the face of the instrument, but is revealed by other
evidence." 7 From the very definition then, extrinsic evidence must
be introduced to reveal latency. A court should not employ a
theory which purports to admit evidence to arrive at a conclusion,
when the conclusion itself serves to justify the admission in the first
instance. The circular operation of the rule indicates its absence of
value. The law would be best served by its burial.8
As a substitute for rules using the word "ambiguity" as a signal
to formally recognize evidence already admitted and evaluated by
the judge, 9 the simpler and more easily applied rule of admitting
all relevant evidence introduced for the purpose of ascertaining the
meaning of the written words should be adopted." This rule would
do no violence to the respect traditionally given the written word
in contract law, since the evidence is not introduced to vary items.
If evidence having the effect of varying terms were introduced, it
could be excluded as being irrelevant to the interpretation issue. In
this context, a finding that a contract is integrated would simply
act to limit the language subject to the process of interpretation. 7'
The rule recommends itself as being an accurate statement of the
conduct of trial judges interested in ascribing to contract language
that meaning which the parties intended.
One last consideration concerns whether a court's emphasis on
67. 63 Wis. 2d at 355, 217 N.W.2d at 298, quoting with approval 32A C.J.S. Evidence
§ 961 (1964).
68. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 543A (rev. ed. 1960).
69. Interpretation is usually a judicial function. 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 616 (rev.
ed. 1936). However, when evidence is in dispute, it may become a question of fact for the
jury. See J. CALAMARI and J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 49 (1970); Cargill Coal Co. v. Valen-
tine, 275 Wis. 548, 82 N.W.2d 883 (1950); Lemke v. Larsen Co., 35 Wis. 2d 427, 151
N.W.2d 17 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 238 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970).
70. A. CORBIN, supra note 64. See also E. Patterson, The Interpretation of Construction
of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964). Although Patterson apparently recognizes the
validity of the admission sequence based on first finding an ambiguity, a look at the
numerous exceptions to his general "plain meaning" rule ("ambiguity" is one of the excep-
tions) suggests that most relevant evidence on the question of interpretation would be
admitted even under his formula. At p. 839, citing Judge Learned Hand in Eustis Mining
Co. v. Beer, 239 Fed. 976 (S.D. N.Y. 1917), the author describes the "plain meaning" rule
as an outer limit on what meaning may be ascribed to words. It is submitted that this
limitation could better be characterized as the judge's own experience affecting his ultimate
finding, rather than as a rule which excludes evidence offered to convince the judge that a
particular meaning is appropriate.
71. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 539 (rev. ed. 1960). To quote from this section: "This
[an integration] is an assent to those words, not to any particular meaning of those words."
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the intents of the individual parties conflicts with the so-called
objective theory of contracts. In short, the objective theory holds
that a party may be bound by a meaning different than that in-
tended by him, because he had reason to know that the other party
might ascribe to the words a meaning different than his own. The
point is that a court adopts one interpretation over the other, not
because one attributes an intrinsically correct meaning to the
words, but because one of the parties had reason to know that a
different meaning might reasonably be understood.7 2 The court is
still concentrating on the meaning given to the language by the
parties, and requires the available extrinsic evidence if its finding
is to be as accurate as possible.
D. Parol Evidence Rule
In Marshall and Isley Bank v. Milwaukee Gear Company,73
the executor of the estate of W.C. Kohls sued to enforce a contract
between Kohls and the defendant company. In 1958, Kohls had
created an inter vivos revocable trust whose corpus consisted of
cumulative preferred stock in Milwaukee Gear Company. As part
of a financial reorganization, the corporation entered into an
agreement with Kohls in 1965 under which the corporation con-
tracted to redeem upon demand Kohls' preferred stock at par
value. There were some time limits on the right to demand redemp-
tion. The consideration for the corporation's undertaking was
Kohls' surrender of the cumulative incident of his right to divi-
dends. The right to demand redemption was expressly reserved to
Kohls' executor in the contract.
When the plaintiff, as executor, demanded that the corporation
repurchase the shares, the corporation refused. The court first
ruled that the transfer of shares into a revocable trust had not
extinguished the personal redemption right of Kohls. The court
then ruled on the propriety of the trial court's exclusion of certain
evidence under the parol evidence rule. Apparently finding an inte-
gration, the supreme court's discussion focused on the failure of the
defendant to bring the evidence offered within the "exceptions" to
the parol evidence rule. Consideration of these "exceptions" points
up important limitations to the application of the rule.
The "parol evidence rule" is a matter of substantive law74 which
72. A. CORBIN, supra note 64; 50 CORN. L.Q. at 167-170.
73. Supra note 57.




may operate to exclude evidence extrinsic to a written contract.
The rule exists for the purpose of preserving the form of the con-
tractual terms in the state originally agreed on. This protection of
form is effected by the contract parties themselves, in agreeing at
the time of execution that the writing is to be a final and complete
expression of the contract. This agreement as to finality is called
an integration. The finding of the fact of integration invokes the
parol evidence rule, which has been defined as follows:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in
a writing to which they have both assented as the complete and
accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or
otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not
be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writ-
ing.75
The rule renders prior agreements irrelevant because the writing
was intended by the parties to supercede them.
The court in the Milwaukee Gear Company case dealt with the
"condition precedent exception" to the rule. The defendant at-
tempted to introduce evidence showing that in addition to the
terms of the writing, Kohls had orally agreed at the time of execu-
tion to certain other limitations on his right to demand that the
corporation redeem his stock. Being clearly a term additional to
the integrated contract, an exception to the reach of the parol
evidence rule was required if the evidence was to be admitted. The
defendant argued that the terms he sought to prove would, if ad-
mitted as part of the contract, act as conditions precedent to the
corporation's duty to perform. These matters, argued the defen-
dant, fell within the "condition precedent exception."
The court rejected the argument. It held that the exception
refers to a condition precedent to the existence of the contract,
rather than to a condition precedent to a ripened obligation to
perform under a contract already in existence. In simpler terms,
the parol evidence rule does not apply until there is an integrated
contract,7 because otherwise there would be no agreement which
would act to supercede the earlier agreements or negotiations. Cor-
rectly employed, the exception permits evidence to be introduced
75. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (rev. ed. 1960). See also 4 S. WILLISTON § 631 (rev.
ed. 1936). Where the contract is for the sale of goods, the more permissive rules of the
Uniform Commercial Code apply. WIs. STAT. § 402.202.
76. Kryl v. Mechalson, 259 Wis. 204, 47 N.W.2d 899 (1951); Hicks v. Bush, 10 N.Y.
2d 488, 180 N.E.2d 425 (1962).
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only for the purpose of disproving the contract's existence. When
the true nature of admissibility is recognized, its characterization
as an exception appears inappropriate, because the evidence is
intended to prove that the rule never applied in the first instance.




The recently-completed term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reflected no slackening of the growth of appeals in the criminal
justice system.' As could be expected, many cases lent themselves
to per curiam disposition under court rule 251.93, while still others
sought decisions on narrow factual questions. There were, how-
ever, a sufficient number of cases of significant precedential import
to keep the criminal law field in its normal state of flux.
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Certainly the turmoil of the criminal law is no better exempli-
fied than in the rules governing the investigative frontier of the
justice system. In this area, the court found the opportunity to
implement full searches of the person without a warrant whenever
a valid custodial arrest is made, even if for traffic offenses. This
ruling in State v. Mabra,2 while apparently having the potential to
ease the constitutionally serious decisions police must make before
embarking on searches, might cause increased battles in two other
areas: the grounds for arrest and the ultimate scope of the search.
Mabra is remarkable initially in that the broad rule of search
after arrest was dicta. The defendant objected to the evidential
admissibility of the alleged fruits of an armed robbery on the
grounds of an illegal search and seizure. The items were found on
his wife, with whom he was arrested, during a search at the police
station. Ruling that there was probable cause to arrest both par-
77. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
1. A Tribute to Wisconsin's Fiftieth Justice-Remarks of Justice Horace W. Wilkie,
47 Wis. BAR BUL. 20, 21-22 (Oct. 1974).
2. 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974).
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